Limits of the freedom of speech: Propaganda advocating racism and hatred clear obligations of European states by Heintze, Hans-Joachim
1216-2574 / USD 20.00
© 2010 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA
51, No 4, pp. 245–252 (2010) 
DOI: 10.1556/AJur.51.2010.4.1
HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE*
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Abstract. The prohibition of “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred” by modern international law 
demonstrates more than any other provision concerning mass media a response effected by the horrors of 
National Socialism. It is primarily conceived of a special duty by States to take preventive measures to enforce 
the principle of non-discrimination and the right to life. This provision seems nowadays of special importance 
all over Europe. After the revolutions in former communist countries in the 1990s the democratic governments 
and movements are searching for new approaches to guarantee individual freedom, peace and social justice. 
Freedom of expression plays a decisive role in these conditions. People have eagerly embraced this freedom, so 
long withheld from them, and are using it to express their democratic aspirations. At the same time, this newly 
won freedom of expression has being misused to disseminate fascism and racial hatred. In the Balkans terrible 
crimes against humanity were committed. “Ethnic cleansing” was one of the results of this misuse of the 
freedom of expression. But also in post WW II democracies–like in Germany–one can ﬁ nd books and papers 
with racist und neo-fascist propaganda, sometime distributed by international networks.  The attempt of the 
German government to prohibit the right-wing “National Party of Germany” (NPD) shows that the politics try 
to undertake some action against neo-fascist activities and propaganda.  This  paper examines the legal basis for 
international prohibitions against media content advocating war, racism and fascism and shows the ways in 
which democratic countries have handled (or failed to handle) this thorny issue.
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payment order, non-litigious proceeding, deed
The international legal standard 
The United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force and establishes universal 
respect for and observance of human rights. These principles have their application in the 
ﬁ eld of communication in three binding instruments of international law that prohibit 
warmongering, racist and genocidal media content. The 1948 Convention of the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide makes punishable direct and public incitement to 
commit genocide. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits 
propaganda and advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred. The 1965 International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination makes punishable by 
law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial 
discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race. At 
the European level also the European Convention on Human Rights is of relevance if media 
as used to infringe human rights. If mass media incite racial discrimination then they violate 
Article 17 of the convention which prohibits any activity aimed at the destruction of any of 
the rights set forth in the convention. Even if an international agreement does not contain an 
express obligation of member States to enact legislation, it is implicit in all human rights 
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conventions that the States internal legal order must secure the rights expressed in those 
international law agreements. 
Who is included under these prohibitions? States themselves, including state-controlled 
or state-ﬁ nanced mass media (for example, government broadcasting stations) are forbidden 
from disseminating war or racial propaganda. Private media are also included in this ban. 
The argument heard often is that international law does not apply to private media ﬁ rms. 
However, Article 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties emphasizes that 
states have general obligations in the sphere of international law which they cannot evade 
by pointing to domestic laws. The manner in which international law is enforced on private 
media is a matter of a state’s sovereign decision-making; the point is that these measures 
must be promulgated. Private media must comply with the laws of the state in which they 
operate. If international law prohibits propaganda for racism, the state has an obligation to 
regulate the private media in this regard. 
It is a well-accepted rule of international law that the only barriers to private 
dissemination of information across borders which States are responsible for ensuring under 
international law is the prohibition on incitement of violence against foreign States, 
genocide, and racist propaganda.
 
Prohibition of hatred propaganda versus freedom of opinion?
In the 1940s, these prohibitions were objects of considerable international debate. States 
party to the 1948 Genocide Convention had no reservations about making direct and public 
incitement to commit genocide punishable by law. But during the drafting of the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), most delegates supported the US “free 
ﬂ ow” position, that all ideas, regardless of their content, should be freely disseminated. The 
majority voted against including a clause prohibiting propaganda for racial hatred in Article 
19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This famous article states: 
“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interferences and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
 
Despite this formulation, we must keep in mind that Article 19 does not guarantee 
absolute freedom of opinion and expression. All freedoms guaranteed by the UDHR are 
qualiﬁ ed by Article 29, which declares that freedoms necessarily carry with them a duty 
toward the community. Article 29 para. 3 asserts explicitly: “These rights and freedoms 
may in no case be exercised contrary to the purpose and principles of the United Nations.”
In the 1960s, during the drafting of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the West once again insisted that the “free ﬂ ow” doctrine meant 
that freedom of expression should also guarantee propaganda for racism. Article 19 of the 
ICCPR restates the UDHR formulation: 
“1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression-, this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice.”
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But the majority of states agreed that there were certain kinds of information content 
that should be absolutely forbidden. Article 20 of the ICCPR declares:  
“1. Any propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
2. Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.” 
Even Article 19(3) of the ICCPR goes on to qualify the rights to freedom of expression 
and opinion: 
“The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, 
but these shall only be such as provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of the 
right or reputations of others: (b) for the protection of national security or of public 
order, or of public health or morals.”
Thus, both the UDHR and the ICCPR demonstrate the incontrovertible link between 
freedom and responsibility. Freedom of expression goes hand in hand with a ban on certain 
communication contents. While the UDHR is implicit, the ICCPR is explicit–with one 
complication. Article 20(2) of the ICCPR implies that a casual relationship must be 
established between media advocacy of racial hatred and actual carrying out of violent 
acts. This leaves the clause open to varying interpretations since it is not always easy to 
provide evidence of this causal connection. 
Sometimes the connection is unmistakable. Under present international law, German 
media of the time between 1933 and 1945 could have been punished for incitement to racial 
hatred. After World War II, the Nuremberg Tribunal tried, convicted and executed Journalist 
Julius Streicher, editor of the anti-semitic Der Stürmer newspaper. He was accused of 
“crimes against humanity” under the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 
The Nuremberg judges interpreted “crimes against humanity” to include Propaganda and 
incitement to genocide. Based on a content analysis of articles from Der Stürmer, the judges 
found that causal connection and determined that Streicher had aroused the German people 
to active persecution of the Jewish people. 
Another binding international legal instrument does not have the complicating factor 
of the ICCPR. The 1965 International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Anti-Racism Convention) contains a sweeping ban on dissemination of any 
racist ideas, with no causal connection demanded. It also categorically outlaws all racist and 
neo-fascist organisations. In Article 4 of the Anti-Racism Convention, states party 
“condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of 
superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which 
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form, and under- 
take to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, 
or arts of, such discrimination and, to this end, with due regard to the principles 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 5 of this 
Convention [Emphasis added] ... inter alia:
(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on 
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of 
violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another 
colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, 
including the ﬁ nancing thereof; 
248 HANS-JOACHIM HEINTZE
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also organized and all other 
propaganda activities, which promote and incite racial discrimination, and shall 
recognize participation in such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by 
law. 
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions, national or local, to 
promote or incite racial discrimination.”
During the drafting of the Anti-Racism Convention, the question arose among the 
Western delegations: does not freedom of expression guarantee freedom even for the most 
abhorrent statements of racial hatred? In the end, Article 4 was included only on the 
condition that the additional “due regard clause” proposed by the US be accepted as well. 
Scholars summarize the prevailing thinking on this: 
“The format of Article 4, which focuses primarily on protecting persons from racial 
discrimination, implies that in cases of conﬂ ict the balance between competing 
freedoms should be struck in favour of persons’ rights to freedom from racial 
discrimination.”1 
To conclude, then, these conventions enshrine in binding treaties basic indisputable 
principles of international law. The ICCPR and the Anti-Racism Convention, binding for 
more than 160 States, ban any form of racist propaganda. The Genocide Convention forbids 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide. 
The implementation of the obligations differs
These principles enjoy near-universal respect. In today’s political environment, no politician 
or governmental leader would dare to oppose these principles. Yet the actual implementation 
and the enforcement of these enshrined principles has been irregular at best.
How do the various states parties to these conventions implement the bans in do-
mestic law? 
As previously mentioned, most western states opposed these prohibitions in the ﬁ rst 
place. Even after the conventions were adopted by the UN General Assembly, a variety of 
adherence patterns has become evident, particularly in regard to “reservations” and 
“statements of interpretation”. In general, international law allows a state to make 
reservations to a treaty that is to exclude or modify the legal effect of certain provisions of 
the treaty in their national application in that state. Reservations to treaties must receive the 
consent of other signatories. In contrast, statements of interpretation–deriving from the 
principles that contracting states should themselves interpret the convention which they 
conclude with one another–do not require such consent. 
Let us now examine how different countries have enforced, or failed to enforce, the 
prohibitions against war, racial and genocide Propaganda. 
The United States hesitated a very long time to ratify and implement international UN-
human rights conventions. For years, the US Senate rejected human rights treaties on the 
grounds that they diminish basic rights guaranteed under the US Constitution: violate states’ 
rights; promote world government; subject citizens to trial abroad; threaten their form of 
1 Mahalic, D.–Mahalic, J. G.: The Limitation Provisions of the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Human Rights Quarterly, 9 (1987) 1, 89.
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government, infringe on domestic jurisdiction-, and increase international involvement. In 
1988 the United States ratiﬁ ed and enacted into national law the Genocide Convention 
Implementation Act. After that it became illegal under US law for any group or individual 
to “directly and publicly incite another” to violate the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
This is the only international human rights norm with media consequences to be 
incorporated into US law. There has been endless discussion in the United States about 
legal limits on the mass media. We sometimes hear views that “there can be no ‘free speech’ 
or ‘balanced news’ unless those who advocate racism and apartheid and, yes, war are also 
free to speak”.2
At the centre of the discussion is the question of how to reconcile the law with freedom 
of opinion and expression. The argument goes that the First Amendment supersedes any 
international legal restriction, even for such worthy goals as prohibiting racism and war. As 
a consequence, the American Civil Liberties Union even defends the First Amendment 
rights of such groups as the Ku Klux Klan, whose views are prohibited from media discourse 
in scores of countries. Consequently, President Carter signed ICCPR and the Anti-Racism 
Convention in 1978 and submitted them to the Senate for ratiﬁ cation with many reservations, 
among them one concerning rights to free speech. During the ratiﬁ cation procedure the 
Senate declared the following reservation: 
“That the Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive protections of 
individual freedom of speech, expression and association. Accordingly, the United 
States does not accept any obligation under this Convention, in particular under Articles 
4 and 7, to restrict those rights, through the adoption of legislation or any other 
measures, to the extent that they are protected by the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.”
Other countries have not been so hesitant. The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 
ratiﬁ ed both conventions without reservation. In contrast, Belgium has ratiﬁ ed and 
implemented both but has presented statements of interpretation concerning both articles. 
The United Kingdom is an illustrative example of these tensions between freedom and 
responsibility. The UK made a reservation to Article 20 of the ICCPR. Nothing in the UK 
law forbids propaganda for war as such. To this extent, the law falls short of the requirements, 
as many members of the Human Rights Committee have pointed out during dialogues on 
the UK’s periodic reports. The standard response was always that this propaganda is not a 
problem in the UK and that any problems which arise might be expected to be dealt with 
under the law of sedition or the Public Order Act 1986. 
Britain made not a reservation but a “statement of interpretation” on Article 4 of the 
Anti-Racism Convention, namely, that further legislation would only be passed in Great 
Britain if compatible with other rights – especially the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression. Why the UK did this is difﬁ cult to discern since the statement is in principle 
merely a repetition of the “due regard clause” of that Article 4 itself. Therefore several 
members of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the organ 
of the parties to the Anti-Racism Convention, rejected the claim. 
The British case in the CERD revealed two things. First, British ratiﬁ cation and 
implementation of the Anti-Racism Convention did not necessarily mean the United 
Kingdom had overcome its original opposition to the prohibition of racist propaganda. 
2 New York Times, 27 Nov. 1978, A35.
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Second, the case made the CERD adopt a clear position concerning the obligations of 
Article 4.
In 1972, the CERD adopted General Recommendation 1, which determined that a 
number of states parties had not passed any Legislation in accordance with the provisions 
of Article 4 of the Anti-Racism Convention. States were called upon to bring their 
domestic laws in line with the Convention. Already in 1980, after analyzing over 100 
states’ reports over 16 years, CERD reported that there were still some states parties who 
had failed to introduce the legislation called for in the Convention. The CERD once again 
endorsed its General Recommendation 1, pointed to the preventive effect of law in acts 
of racial discrimination and called on states parties to implement Article 4 in their 
domestic law. 
An analogous experience occurred in the Human Rights Committee, composed of 
states parties to the ICCPR. When France ratiﬁ ed the Convention, it at ﬁ rst presented a 
statement of interpretation to Article 20(1), namely that French Legislation was already in 
accordance with the Covenant in this respect. France later wanted this to be considered a 
reservation. Non-compliance is as much a problem in the ICCPR as it is in the Anti-Racism 
Convention, for in 1983, the Human Rights Committee called on states parties to the 
ICCPR to 
“adopt the necessary legislative measures prohibiting the actions referred to therein ... 
In the opinion of the Committee, these required prohibitions fully compatible with the 
right to freedom of expression ... the exercise of which carries with it special duties 
and responsibilities.”
Most states parties have complied with the Anti-Racism Convention, though the route 
implementation oftentimes has been circuitous. The Latin American states have been 
particular pace-setters. Ecuador incorporated Article 4 in its penal code almost verbatim and 
Brazil went so far as to make any incitement to racial prejudice punishable by law. Both 
Italy and Greece enacted laws in accordance with the prohibition on racist propaganda. 
But many western states are lagging behind. Although Canada banned the public 
dissemination of racist ideas, no legislation was passed to ban private fascist and racist 
groups. British Legislation made a similar distinction. In Britain, dissemination of racist 
ideas is permitted as long as it does not incite racial hatred. Though this still contravenes 
Article 4 of the Anti-Racism Convention, it nevertheless represents some progress. Britain 
no longer claims that it has submitted a reservation, and has also reported that laws in 
accord with Article 4 were in the process of revision.
In 1985, the CERD renewed its appeal to the United Kingdom to bring its legislation 
in line with the Convention’s obligations. The CERD criticised the British position in two 
ways: it said that Article 4 and freedom of opinion do not contradict one another. It also 
disputed that a state only has a duty to enact Legislation if there are speciﬁ c problems in 
race relations. In the end, though, the CERD reported that progress had been made toward 
implementing Article 4 around the world. 
The Anti-Racism Convention also bans organized groups from inciting racial hatred. 
In this regard subsection (b) of Article 4 qualities subsection (a) to a certain extent. Using 
this as an excuse, most western countries have pointed to this provision in their attempt to 
avoid outlawing racist and fascist organisations. For example, in Canada the fascist “Western 
Guard Party” still operates. Some of its members have been charged with illegal possession 
of arms and some racist propaganda was seized, but the organisation was never actually 
banned. Over a number of years this “Party” had used public telephone services to warn “of 
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the dangers of international ﬁ nance and Jewry leading the world into wars”. The only result 
was that they were precluded from using the telephone services, in conformity with the 
express authority in the Canadian Human Right Act. The Human Rights Committee 
supported this preclusion because the “Party” seeks to disseminate through the telephone 
system opinions which clearly constitute the advocacy of racial hatred which Canada has an 
obligation under Article 20 (2) CCPR to prohibit.3 
Many signatories have openly stated their intention not to forbid racist and fascist 
organisations. The Federal Republic of Germany, for instance, allows the “National 
Democratic Party of Germany” (NPD), the “National Assembly”, and other neo-fascist 
organisations to operate freely. CERD criticised this non-compliance. Contrary to its 
obligations under the Anti-Racism Convention, Germany believes that banning the NPD is 
not a judicial issue but rather a question of political opportunism. The FRG admitted that 34 
neo-fascist organisations exist in the country. At the same time it claimed that the neo-Nazi 
groups have slipped into political oblivion. This position has been accepted by CERD. It 
needed as long as the year 2001 after many racist attacks all over Germany that the German 
government decided to apply from the Federal Constitutional Court the prohibition of the 
NPD. It is the Federal Constitutional Court alone that decides on the unconstitutionality of 
political parties. Only applications can be made by the Parliament, the Federal Council or 
the government.
The United Kingdom violates its obligation to the Convention by allowing neo-fascist 
and extreme right-wing groups to operate freely. At the CERD, the British representative 
did not deny these groups’ existence. He argued that such organisations were tolerated 
because they did not have a great following and that banning them would contradict freedom 
of opinion and expression. He did not answer whether such organisations would be banned 
if they did attract a mass following. The status of British compliance has not changed. 
Therefore the CERD expressed in 1996 again its concern over the British interpretation of 
Article 4: “Such an interpretation is not only in conﬂ ict with the established view of the 
Committee, … but also amounts to a negation of the State Party’s obligation  … to outlaw 
and prohibit organizations which promote and incite racial discrimination” (UN-Doc. 
CERD/C/304/Add.9). 
In general, Western countries ﬁ nd it difﬁ cult to comply with the provisions of Article 
4(b). Most do not deny that they are violating international law by failing to take judicial or 
administrative measures to ban racist or neo-fascist organisations. Instead, they ask for 
understanding regarding their domestic obligations. Clearly, states parties’ obligation to 
Article 4 of the Anti-Racism Convention will remain a central issue in CERD.
On closer scrutiny, though, this argument of the freedom of opinion is faulty. When, 
for example, Iceland’s representative to the Human Rights Committee maintained that 
prohibiting of racist propaganda would violate freedom of expression, some committee 
members asked him to justify that country’s ban on tobacco and alcohol advertisements. He 
was not able to give an answer. In like manner, the United Kingdom refused to withdraw its 
reservations to Article 20(1) of the ICCPR when called upon to do so by the Human Rights 
Committee. The government maintained that propaganda posed no problem for the United 
Kingdom and that there was no need to adopt legal measures banning it. 
3 Manfred Nowak, CCPR Commentary, see supra note 1, 367. Nowak, M.: U.N. Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. CCPR Commentary. Kehl, 1993; UNO-Pakt über bürgerliche und politische 
Rechte und Fakultativprotokoll – CCPRKommentar, Kehl-Straßburg-Arlington, 1989.
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Also the newly democratic States in Europe like Croatia have some problems with the 
prohibition of hatred propaganda and racist organizations, especially after civil wars. 
Therefore the CERD articulated in 1999 concern at incidents of hate-speech directed at the 
Serb minority in Croat media and the failure of the State party to take adequate measures to 
investigate and prosecute those responsible for promoting hatred and ethnic tension through 
print and audio-visual media. The CERD noted also with concern the lack of legal provisions 
required in order to implement to prohibition of racist organizations, because it is the 
absence of legislative measures declaring those organizations illegal which promote and 
incite racial discrimination (UN-Doc. CERD/C/304/Add.5). 
Conclusion 
There are still some gaps between international law standards and the practice on some 
States concerning hatred propaganda. But it is very important that we have nowadays a 
whole body of international law dealing with information and established clear prohibitions. 
Clearly, the concept of free expression as reﬂ ected in the human rights instruments is non-
absolute and may be subjected to impairment in certain circumstances. These norms are 
binding to more than 150 States which belong to the Genocide Convention, the CCPR and 
to the Anti racism Convention. Some aspects of these conventions represent without any 
doubt customary international law. This is reﬂ ected by regional instruments. The American 
Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, and the Helsinki Accords each codify the right to free speech 
with speciﬁ c limitations. However, it is true that one can observe some hesitation on the 
side of many States to implement all components especially of the UN-conventions in a 
correct way, because they are convinced that there are other ways to deal with racist 
propaganda. On the other hand there is an increasing public awareness worldwide and 
stronger involvement of the civil societies in the States. This gives hope that international 
law will be implemented in the future in more proper way. 
